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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 10, 2004, Pedro Cabrera made a statement that cost him 
fourteen years of his life: he proclaimed his innocence.
1
 Mr. Cabrera 
pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery in exchange for the dismis-
sals of one count of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated unlawful 
restraint, two counts of burglary, as well as a recommended six year sen-
tence.
2
 The court accepted this plea and ordered a finding of guilty.
3
 
However, during an exchange that followed, Mr. Cabrera asserted that he 
was actually innocent but that he preferred “to take the time” instead of 
proceeding to trial.
4
 The judge then refused to accept Mr. Cabrera’s 
guilty plea, vacated the entry of the plea, and set the matter for trial in 
order to give Mr. Cabrera “a chance to prove [his] innocence.”
5
 Eventu-
ally, Mr. Cabrera was convicted of all counts at a bench trial and sen-
tenced to twenty years.
6
 
In 2010, Mr. Cabrera filed a habeas corpus petition in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that his 
conviction violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy 
because his guilty plea had been vacated and he had been forced to stand 
trial.
7
 In addressing his claim, the court noted a split among the circuits 
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 1. People v. Cabrera, 402 Ill. App. 3d 440, 442–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 442. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 443. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Cabrera v. Acevedo, No. 11 C 1390, 2012 WL 716906, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2012). 
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over “whether double jeopardy prevents a court from sua sponte vacating 
the plea and proceeding to trial.”
8
  Thus, Mr. Cabrera could not make the 
required showing that the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.”
9
 Mr. Cabrera’s petition was 
denied.
10
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person will “be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
11
 
This protection has been applied to state proceedings through the Four-
teenth Amendment as “a fundamental ideal in our constitutional herit-
age.”
12
 The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois correctly 
noted that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of 
whether a court’s decision to sua sponte vacate a defendant’s guilty plea 
and proceed to trial violates double jeopardy protections.
13
 Instead, there 
is a clear circuit split. Mr. Cabrera’s case indicates that the current split 
over the constitutionality of a court accepting a guilty plea and then sua 
sponte vacating that plea, forcing the defendant to stand trial, has ramifi-
cations beyond trial courts: the uncertainty itself dooms habeas corpus 
petitions to fail. 
The traditional rule, which generally understands jeopardy to attach 
at the point that a guilty plea has been accepted,
14
 is the appropriate rule. 
Such a rule would prevent a court from sua sponte vacating an already-
accepted guilty plea and forcing the defendant to stand trial, thereby de-
priving the defendant of the finality that comes with his guilty plea, and, 
if there was a plea bargain, depriving both the prosecution and defendant 
the benefits of their bargain. 
Part II examines the underpinnings of the traditional Double Jeop-
ardy rule. Part III analyzes the circuit split that developed in the wake of 
Ohio v. Johnson.
15
 Part IV discusses and evaluates the policy justifica-
tions and implications for both the traditional rule and the new rule. Part 
IV also assesses whether jeopardy has attached based on an evaluation of 
the defendant’s finality interest and the potential for prosecutorial over-
reaching. Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
                                                 
 8. Id. 
 9. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) (2013). 
 10. Cabrera, 2012 WL 716906, at *3. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 12. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
 13. Cabrera, 2012 WL 716906, at *2. 
 14. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Vaughan, 715 
F.2d 1373, 1378 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Mark Hammond, United States v. Patterson: When 
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause Protect Defendants in Federal Court?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
467, 468 (2005). 
 15. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
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II. THE TRADITIONAL RULE 
Under the traditional rule, jeopardy is understood to attach when a 
court accepts a guilty plea.
16
 The justification for the traditional rule, 
perhaps most precisely stated by Justice Stevens, is that “[a] conviction 
based on a plea of guilty has the same legal effect as a conviction based 
on a jury’s verdict.”
17
 Therefore, “[j]eopardy attaches with the ac-
ceptance of a guilty plea.”
18
  Because the Double Jeopardy Clause was 
“designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of 
trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense,”
19
 
forcing a defendant to stand trial after being convicted by guilty plea is 
impermissible under this logic. 
The court in United States v. Cruz
20
 applied the traditional rule and 
declined to adopt an absolutist position “that jeopardy must attach auto-
matically and irrevocably in all instances when a guilty plea is accept-
ed.”
21
 The defendant had been indicted on charges related to cocaine dis-
tribution but accepted a plea bargain, which required him only to plead 
guilty to a misdemeanor charge of possessing cocaine.
22
 The court un-
conditionally accepted the plea bargain but on the day of sentencing, re-
jected it based on its review of the pre-sentencing reports of the defend-
ant and two co-defendants, who had also pleaded guilty.
23
 After the orig-
inal indictment was reinstated, the defendant filed an interlocutory ap-
peal, arguing that the continued prosecution violated his protection 
against double jeopardy.
24
 
The First Circuit attempted to balance judicial flexibility with the 
understanding “that jeopardy must attach somewhere and bar reconsider-
ation at some point.”
25
 The court explicitly rejected the view that jeop-
ardy only attached at the point of sentencing.
26
 The court concluded that 
the preferable balance would be a holding that acceptance of a guilty plea 
                                                 
 16. United States v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Vaughan, 715 F.2d at 
1378 n.2). 
 17. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 18. United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 19. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
 20. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the facts and hold-
ing of Cruz, see Hammond, supra note 14, at 472–74. 
 21. Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114. 
 22. Id. at 111–12. 
 23. Id. at 112. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 114. 
 26. Id. at 113–14. 
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causes jeopardy to attach but that the court could vacate the plea before 
sentencing if manifest necessity
27
 was shown.
28
 
The court’s analysis in Cruz shows some consideration of the poli-
cies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court noted that “the 
ordeal of a [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] Rule 11 proceeding is 
significantly different from the ordeal of a trial,” particularly when, as in 
Cruz, the plea was to a lesser included offense which “carries no implied 
acquittal of the greater offense.”
29
 Ultimately, the First Circuit found that 
jeopardy had attached in Cruz because under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 (Rule 11), a court may accept, reject, or defer a decision on 
a plea pending the court’s review of a pre-sentence report.
30
 Thus, the 
trial court’s acceptance of the plea caused jeopardy to attach.
31
  
In United States v. Patterson, the Ninth Circuit applied the tradi-
tional rule in a way that emphasized the importance of the discretion af-
forded trial courts under Rule 11.
32
 In Patterson, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to one count of manufacturing marijuana, but the plea agreement 
did not specify the quantity of plants.
33
 While the agreement originally 
provided for the quantity of plants to be determined at sentencing, an 
intervening Supreme Court case
34
 called the validity of the plea into 
question. On the government’s motion, the court vacated Mr. Patterson’s 
plea; he was convicted at trial of manufacturing 100 or more marijuana 
plants, and sentenced to 188 months in prison and five years of super-
vised release.
35
 The court remanded Mr. Patterson’s case with orders to 
reinstate his guilty plea and sentence him accordingly.
36
 In doing so, the 
court discussed the limits placed on trial courts by Rule 11.
37
 It conclud-
ed that “[o]nce the court accepted the plea and deferred acceptance of the 
plea agreement . . . the court was not free to vacate the plea on the gov-
                                                 
 27. A showing of manifest necessity is required for a retrial after a mistrial declared over the 
defendant’s objection. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). The classic example of 
manifest necessity is the deadlocked jury. Id. at 509. 
 28. Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114. 
 29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30. Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). 
 31. Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114–15. 
 32. United States v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the facts and 
procedural history of Patterson, see Hammond, supra note 14, at 468–71. 
 33. Patterson, 381 F.3d at 861. The maximum sentence for manufacturing an unspecified 
amount of marijuana was five years. Id. at 863. 
 34. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446 (2000) (holding that the jury must determine beyond 
a reasonable doubt any fact that increases penalty for a crime beyond statutory maximum, except for 
prior convictions). 
 35. Patterson, 381 F.3d at 862. 
 36. Id. at 865–66. 
 37. This rule governs the acceptance of guilty pleas. 
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ernment’s motion.”
38
 However, the court also noted that a defendant can 
move to have his guilty plea set aside and stand trial for the same offense 
without implicating double jeopardy concerns.
39
 
Morris v. Reynolds,
40
 which arose in the context of a habeas corpus 
petition, applies the traditional rule and provides a useful discussion of 
its development. In that case, petitioner Morris was indicted on two 
counts of criminal possession of a weapon: a felony third degree count 
and a misdemeanor fourth degree count.
41
 The felony count was dis-
missed on June 4, 1994, because of the insufficiency of the grand jury’s 
evidence.
42
 Mr. Morris pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge on Au-
gust 1, 1994, with the understanding that he would receive a probation-
ary sentence, and the prosecution did not object.
43
 In a rather confusing 
turn of events, the trial judge—who had dismissed the felony count due 
to the insufficiency of the grand jury’s evidence—issued an order that 
appeared to have been backdated to July 29, 1994.
44
 The order found that 
there was sufficient evidence to reinstate the felony count.
45
 On October 
21, 1994, when Mr. Morris was to be sentenced, the trial judge reinstated 
the felony count.
46
 Mr. Morris then petitioned to set aside the reinstate-
ment of the felony count and be sentenced in accordance with the plea 
deal for his guilty plea to the misdemeanor count.
47
 Mr. Morris’s petition 
was granted by the Appellate Division, but the New York Court of Ap-
peals ultimately rejected his petition.
48
 Mr. Morris then pleaded guilty to 
the felony count and received a sentence of two and a half to five years 
of incarceration.
49
 
In granting Mr. Morris’s petition, the Second Circuit held that “af-
ter a court accepts defendant’s guilty plea to a lesser included offense, 
prosecution for the greater offense violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”
50
 In effect, this not only prevents a trial court from reinstating a 
dismissed felony after accepting a guilty plea to a lesser offense, but also 
prevents the court from vacating a guilty plea to reinstate a greater of-
                                                 
 38. Id. at 863–64. 
 39. Id. at 864. 
 40. Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 41. Id. at 41–42. 
 42. Id. at 42. 
 43. Id. at 43. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 43. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 49. 
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fense.
51
 The Second Circuit, while acknowledging “that a court has the 
power to correct its own errors,” further explained that that power cannot 
infringe on “a defendant’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
finality and repose.”
52
 
Significantly, the Second Circuit in Morris found that the state 
court’s decision was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as 
established by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
53
 Specifically, 
the court concluded that the state courts had applied a rule where jeop-
ardy did not attach until sentencing.
54
 This rule was held to be contrary to 
prior Supreme Court rulings, which the Second Circuit said established 
that “the double jeopardy bar arises, after a conviction but before sen-
tencing, when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included offense, the 
prosecutor did not object to the plea, and there was no greater offense 
pending at the time the plea was accepted.”
55
 While this holding focuses 
on situations where a defendant is charged in a multi-count indictment 
consisting of greater offenses and lesser included offenses, it is derived 
from the broader rule that “the [Double Jeopardy] Clause prohibits a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense following a guilty plea.”
56
 
From the cases discussed above, the traditional rule governing 
whether a court can sua sponte vacate a defendant’s guilty plea and pro-
ceed to trial indicates that jeopardy attaches at the time a court accepts 
the plea. A court is prohibited from vacating the plea either on its own 
motion or on the prosecution’s motion, which forces the defendant to 
either negotiate a new deal or proceed to trial. While Cruz
57
 and Morris
58
 
both contemplate exceptions to this rule, the underlying principle seems 
clear: jeopardy attaches when the court accepts a guilty plea.
59
 Cruz not-
ed that the courts were “nearly unanimous” in this understanding.
60
 
However, this consensus was broken following Ohio v. Johnson,
61
 and a 
circuit split developed in its wake. Of the three cases discussed in this 
Section, Patterson and Morris represent post-Johnson cases that adhere 
                                                 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 50. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 51. 
 56. Id. at 49. 
 57. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that a showing of mani-
fest necessity is sufficient to allow court to sua sponte vacate plea). 
 58. Morris, 264 F.3d at 51 (prosecution objection to plea or pending greater offense could be 
sufficient to allow court to sua sponte vacate plea). 
 59. Cruz, 709 F.2d at 112–13. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
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to the traditional rule, while Cruz has been overruled.
62
 The next Section 
focuses on the development of the current circuit split by analyzing 
Johnson and the subsequent decisions of the circuits that understood 
Johnson to announce a new framework for double jeopardy analysis. 
III. BROWN V. OHIO, OHIO V. JOHNSON, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
NEW RULE 
In United States v. Soto, the First Circuit announced that its double 
jeopardy analysis in Cruz had been overruled by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ohio v. Johnson.
63
 In reaching this conclusion, the court first 
analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Ohio,
64
 as the court 
felt that this was necessary “[f]or a proper understanding of Johnson.”
65
 
In order to properly analyze the First Circuit’s post-Johnson shift, this 
Section will follow the same path. First, this Section examines the rela-
tionship of Brown and Johnson. This is followed by a discussion of Soto 
and Gilmore v. Zimmerman,
66
 where the Third Circuit announced its 
formulation of and adherence to the new post-Johnson rule. 
A. Brown, Johnson, and Double Jeopardy 
In Brown, the defendant stole a car on November 29th, 1973, and 
was arrested on December 8th, 1973.
67
 After his arrest, Mr. Brown 
pleaded guilty to a charge of joyriding and served a corresponding sen-
tence.
68
 After being released, he was taken to a different court and 
charged with auto theft and joyriding based on his November 29th car 
theft.
69
 Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to auto theft “on the understanding that 
the court would consider his claim of former jeopardy on a motion to 
withdraw the plea.”
70
 The trial court rejected his former jeopardy claim 
and gave him a suspended sentence and one year of probation.
71
 The 
Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, noting that even though 
joyriding was a lesser included offense of auto theft, the second prosecu-
                                                 
 62. United States v. Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing an implied overruling 
of Cruz by Johnson). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 67. Brown, 432 U.S. at 162. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 163. 
 71. Id. 
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tion was permissible because the prosecutions were based on different 
acts.
72
 
On review, the Supreme Court reiterated that “[t]he Double Jeop-
ardy Clause ‘protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the 
same offense.’”
73
 The Court noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
serves the policy of protecting a defendant’s finality interest so that the 
defendant would not be subject to “attempts to relitigate the facts under-
lying a prior acquittal” or “attempts to secure additional punishment after 
a prior conviction and sentence.”
74
 Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
“the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative 
punishment for a greater and lesser included offense.”
75
 The Court de-
termined that under Ohio law, “the theft and operation of a single car” 
was only one offense that could not be divided into “a series of temporal 
or spatial units” in order to circumvent the protections of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.
76
 Thus, Mr. Brown could not be convicted of auto 
theft.
77
 
In Ohio v. Johnson,
78
 the Supreme Court again addressed the issue 
of double jeopardy in the context of lesser included offenses, this time 
concluding that conviction on a lesser included offense is not always a 
bar to prosecution on the greater offense. In Johnson, the defendant was 
indicted on four counts: murder, involuntary manslaughter, grand theft, 
and aggravated robbery.
79
 At his arraignment, Mr. Johnson pleaded 
guilty to involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, but he pleaded not 
guilty to murder and aggravated robbery.
80
 Over the prosecution’s objec-
tion, the trial court accepted Mr. Johnson’s guilty pleas.
81
 Mr. Johnson 
then moved for the remaining murder and aggravated robbery charges to 
be dismissed, arguing that continued prosecution on the murder and ag-
gravated robbery charges would violate his protections afforded by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.
82
 The trial court agreed and dismissed the re-
maining counts, reasoning that “because involuntary manslaughter and 
grand theft were, respectively, lesser included offenses of murder and 
aggravated robbery,” Mr. Johnson could not be prosecuted on the re-
                                                 
 72. Id. at 163–64. 
 73. Id. at 165 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
 74. Brown, 432 U.S. at 165–66. 
 75. Id. at 169. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 169–70. 
 78. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
 79. Id. at 495. 
 80. Id. at 496. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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maining charges due to the acceptance of his guilty pleas.
83
 The Ohio 
Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the 
murder and aggravated robbery charges.
84
 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Ohio Su-
preme Court’s reasoning that continued prosecution would violate the 
“double jeopardy protection prohibiting multiple punishments for the 
same offense.”
85
 The Court noted that multiple punishments would only 
arise if Mr. Johnson was convicted on the dismissed charges, and in that 
situation, the trial court would “have to confront the question of cumula-
tive punishments as a matter of state law.”
86
 However, the Court empha-
sized “the [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not prohibit the State from 
prosecuting [Mr. Johnson] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecu-
tion.”
87
 The Court then proceeded to address Mr. Johnson’s alternative 
argument for affirming the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court: that 
continued prosecution of the dismissed counts would impermissibly re-
sult in “a second prosecution following conviction.”
88
 
The Court distinguished this case from Brown by noting that the 
concerns addressed in the Brown Court were not present in Johnson.
89
 
Specifically, the Court identified “finality and prevention of prosecutori-
al overreaching” as the principles underlying its holding in Brown.
90
 The 
Court emphasized that Mr. Johnson had “offered only to resolve part of 
the charges against him” over the State’s objection,
91
 that the State had 
not attempted to subject Mr. Johnson to multiple trials,
92
 and that his 
guilty plea did not show an implied acquittal on the greater offenses in 
the way that a jury verdict would if the jury was “charged to consider 
both greater and lesser included offenses.”
93
 Thus, Mr. Johnson did not 
have an interest in finality or in protection from prosecutorial overreach-
ing in this case.
94
 The Court refused to permit Mr. Johnson “to use the 
Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing 
its prosecution on the remaining charges.”
95
 
                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Id. at 498. 
 87. Id. at 500. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 501. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 501–02. 
 94. Id. at 501. 
 95. Id. at 502. 
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B. The Development of the New Rule 
In the wake of Johnson, circuit courts reconsidered their double 
jeopardy analysis in the context of guilty pleas that are sua sponte vacat-
ed by a trial court. The Third Circuit
96
 and the First Circuit
97
 were the 
earliest to adopt a new analysis that broke away from the previous con-
sensus on the issue.
98
 
The first indication of a split after Johnson came in the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Gilmore v. Zimmerman.
99
 In Gilmore, the defendant, 
Dr. Gilmore, woke up on November 27, 1980, to find his wife dead in 
their bed.
100
 His wife was determined to have died of the combination of 
alcohol and meperidine, the latter of which had been injected into her 
right buttock.
101
 Dr. Gilmore was charged in Pennsylvania state court 
with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering 
another person, based in part on incriminating statements that he made 
after his wife’s death.
102
 Dr. Gilmore agreed to plead guilty to involun-
tary manslaughter with the understanding that the prosecution would 
make a sentencing recommendation based on a pre-sentencing report to 
be prepared later.
103
 The trial court initially accepted the plea but vacated 
it at sentencing due to an insufficient factual basis.
104
 Dr. Gilmore re-
ceived a change of venue upon his request and asserted double jeopardy 
protections in a motion to dismiss the case.
105
 But the trial court denied 
his motion to dismiss, finding that the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in vacating Dr. Gilmore’s plea for lack of a sufficient factual basis.
106
 
Dr. Gilmore then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, ar-
guing that the decision of the trial judge to sua sponte vacate his guilty 
plea and proceed toward trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
107
 
After he had been denied relief in district court, Dr. Gilmore appealed to 
the Third Circuit.
108
 Directly addressing Dr. Gilmore’s claim that jeop-
ardy had attached at the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea, the 
court held that Ohio v. Johnson foreclosed the possibility of double jeop-
                                                 
 96. Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 97. United States v. Soto, 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 98. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 99. Gilmore, 793 F.2d 564. 
 100. Id. at 564. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 565. 
 103. Id. at 565–66. 
 104. Id. at 566–67. 
 105. Id. at 567. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 564. 
 108. Id; see also Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 619 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Penn. 1985) (district court 
decision denying Dr. Gilmore relief). 
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ardy interests being implicated in single prosecution situations.
109
 The 
court understood that the criminal homicide charge was pending at the 
time of Dr. Gilbert’s guilty plea,
110
 and thus understood his situation to 
be similar to the situation in Johnson—a defendant pleaded guilty to a 
lesser included charge while the greater charge remained pending and 
asserted a double jeopardy bar to prosecution of the greater offense.
111
 
The court dismissed the fact that in this case, and unlike in Johnson, the 
prosecution did not object to the plea, stating that this fact “should have 
no legal significance” in terms of the defendant’s double jeopardy inter-
ests.
112
 
Shortly after the Third Circuit initiated the rejection of the tradi-
tional rule in the wake of Johnson, the First Circuit reevaluated its prior 
holding in Cruz, which had applied the traditional rule.
113
 In U.S. v. Soto, 
the defendant, a postal service inspector, pleaded guilty to a misdemean-
or charge of obstructing the passage of correspondence.
114
 However, up-
on learning that Mr. Santiago Soto professed his innocence, the judge sua 
sponte dismissed the charge after having previously expressed doubts 
about whether Soto acted with criminal intent.
115
 About four months lat-
er, on February 12, 1986, Mr. Soto was indicted by a grand jury on two 
felony charges related to the previous allegations: theft of mail matter 
and obstruction of correspondence.
116
 Mr. Soto sought to have the charg-
es dismissed, but his motion was denied and he was found guilty by a 
jury.
117
 
On review, the First Circuit backtracked from its position in Cruz 
that “jeopardy attaches upon acceptance of the guilty plea,” but deter-
mined instead that a court could vacate the plea any time prior to sen-
tencing if manifest necessity is shown.
118
 The court noted that 
“[u]nderlying Johnson is the proposition that an acceptance of a guilty 
plea is legally different from a conviction based on a jury’s verdict.”
119
 
The court noted Johnson’s focus on the policy goals of protecting de-
fendants’ finality interests and preventing prosecutorial overreaching, 
and proceeded to consider these goals in affirming Mr. Soto’s convic-
                                                 
 109. Gilmore, 793 F.2d at 571. In this case, only one charge was originally filed. Id. at 569. 
 110. Id. at 569–70. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 570 n.2. 
 113. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 114. United States v. Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 617 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 618–19 (quoting Cruz, 709 F.2d at 114). 
 119. Soto, 825 F.2d at 619. 
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tions.
120
 Specifically, the court determined that Mr. Soto’s finality inter-
ests were diminished because the trial court’s “mere acceptance of a 
guilty plea does not carry the same expectation of finality and tranquility 
that comes with a jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sen-
tence.”
121
 While the court noted that prosecutorial overreaching could be 
a concern, the diminished finality interest caused the court to conclude 
that “jeopardy did not attach when the district court accepted the guilty 
plea to the lesser included offense and then rejected the plea without hav-
ing imposed sentence and entered judgment.”
122
 
Together, Gilmore and Soto launched the development of the new 
rule that jeopardy no longer necessarily attaches when the court uncondi-
tionally accepts a guilty plea. A precise formulation of the rule can be 
found in Judge Kozinski’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s order
123
 deny-
ing a petition for a panel rehearing and for a rehearing en banc of Patter-
son v. United States,
124
 which was discussed in Part II of this Note. 
Kozinski stated that in Johnson, “the Court provided a framework . . . for 
determining whether jeopardy attaches when a defendant pleads guilty. A 
court must consider the twin aims of the Double Jeopardy Clause: pro-
tecting a defendant’s finality interests and preventing prosecutorial over-
reaching.”
125
 This framework is understood to dispose of the “previous 
rule that jeopardy attached when the district court accepted a guilty 
plea.”
126
 
This framework traced the development of the circuit split over the 
question of whether jeopardy attaches when a defendant pleads guilty—
starting with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Brown and Johnson, and 
continuing through the development and articulation of the new rule, 
which inquires into whether jeopardy has actually attached in a given 
case.
127
 In the next Part, the policy justifications and ramifications of 
each rule are discussed and evaluated, particularly in the context of situa-
tions that are dissimilar to the facts in Johnson, where the usefulness of 
the new rule is questionable. 
                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 620. 
 122. Id. 
 123. United States v. Patterson, 406 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 124. United States v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 125. Patterson, 406 F.3d at 1097 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 1098. 
 127. Hammond, supra note 14, at 475. 
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IV. PLEAS AND POLICY: EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
TRADITIONAL RULE AND THE NEW RULE 
Before turning to the merits of the competing rules, it is necessary 
to first discuss the overwhelming prevalence of guilty pleas in the crimi-
nal justice system. The Supreme Court has recognized that plea bargain-
ing “is the criminal justice system.”
128
 Accordingly, the courts “have 
proceeded to construct a body of contract-based law to regulate the plea 
bargaining process.”
129
 For the prosecution, a plea bargain is beneficial 
because it conserves resources; for the defendant, a plea bargain offers 
“more favorable terms at sentencing.”
130
 This focus on efficiency, as well 
as the staggering proportion of convictions that are obtained via guilty 
pleas, is indicative of a criminal adjudication system that operates under 
what has been termed the “crime control model.”
131
 Specifically, the high 
rate of guilty pleas signifies widespread judicial acceptance of the as-
sumption “that the screening processes operated by police and prosecu-
tors are reliable indicators of probable guilt.”
132
 If this assumption of ac-
curacy is correct and a defendant is guilty of the crime charged, then plea 
bargaining is indeed mutually beneficial and the crime control model is 
appropriate. 
A. Incentivizing Guilty Pleas—Why an Innocent Defendant Pleads Guilty 
For defendants who are both guilty of the crimes they are charged 
with and likely to be convicted at trial, plea bargaining can be quite bene-
ficial. However, for defendants who are innocent of the charged crimes, 
there is a different set of considerations. While a court must find a factual 
basis for a guilty plea before accepting it,
133
 this requirement does not bar 
a court from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who maintains his 
innocence.
134
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “[a]n individual 
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accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or 
unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”
135
 
Indeed, pleading guilty is incentivized such that an innocent defendant 
may even be better off pleading guilty. For example, in Corbitt v. New 
Jersey,
136
 the Court upheld a New Jersey statute that provided for a man-
datory sentence of life imprisonment for people convicted of first-degree 
murder by jury, while a defendant who pleaded non vult or nolo 
contedere
137
 to the charge
138
 would be sentenced to either life imprison-
ment or a maximum of thirty years (the punishment for second-degree 
murder).
139
 While the facts of Corbitt involved non vult and nolo conten-
dere pleas, the Court ultimately held that “it is not forbidden to extend a 
proper degree of leniency in return for guilty pleas. New Jersey has done 
no more than that.”
140
 
In essence, the same principles that allow states to “encourage a 
guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea”
141
 also 
allow for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to impose a harsher sentence 
on a defendant who is convicted at trial, as opposed to a defendant who 
pleads guilty.
142
 While the guidelines are no longer mandatory, trial 
judges imposing sentences must still consider them.
143
 These incentives 
are easily explained under the crime control model of criminal adjudica-
tion, where “the interest in arriving at accurate conclusions is best served 
through guilty pleas.”
144
 Trials are disfavored under this model because 
their formality makes them more resource-intensive and thus less effi-
cient.
145
 Therefore, guilty pleas are incentivized not only for defendants 
who are guilty of the crime charged, but also for innocent defendants 
who, for one reason or another, are likely to be convicted at trial. While 
the thought of an innocent defendant pleading guilty is unsettling, the 
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structural incentives that make plea bargaining such a potent tool within 
the criminal justice system err on the side of over-conviction.
146
 By im-
posing costs (in the form of longer sentences or more severe charges) on 
those defendants who are convicted at trial, the criminal justice system 
has expressed a policy preference for the less resource-intensive process 
of plea bargaining, as opposed to a trial. 
To illustrate the problems that this preference presents, consider 
three groups of defendants: Group A, which consists of defendants who 
are guilty of the crimes charged and are likely to be convicted; Group B, 
which consists of defendants who are innocent of crimes charged and 
likely to be acquitted; and Group C, which consists of both guilty and 
innocent defendants and it is not certain that the government will be able 
to obtain a conviction at trial. Under the crime control model of criminal 
adjudication described above, accurate results can easily and efficiently 
be achieved for Groups A and B. For Group A, a guilty plea is the opti-
mal result, as it involves an accurate adjudication with minimal resource 
expenditure. Defendants in Group B will see their charges dismissed af-
ter screening by the police or prosecutors, which is an efficient result 
because of the informal handling of the case. However, the consequences 
of the policy choice in favor of a crime control model become apparent 
when analyzing the situation of defendants in Group C. For these de-
fendants, regardless of innocence or guilt, the choice of whether to plead 
guilty is impacted by the incentives that come with a guilty plea. If the 
sentencing leniency that accompanies a guilty plea were not present, the 
defendants would be more likely to go to trial, which could lead to inac-
curacies such as guilty defendants being acquitted. However, when the 
sentencing leniency is taken into account, guilty pleas become a more 
attractive option. This too produces inaccuracies, but in the form of inno-
cent defendants being found guilty. 
Thus, the instances in which an innocent defendant pleads guilty 
are indicative of a criminal justice system that necessarily produces some 
inaccurate results. The problem is that the system chooses to err on the 
side of over-conviction rather than under-conviction. Plea bargains 
reached in these circumstances indicate a rational response to the incen-
tives offered; these bargains are the product of an evaluation of risks—
and the risk of additional punishment following a guilty verdict is signif-
icant.
147
 While the idea of an innocent person pleading guilty initially 
appears problematic, the contemporary criminal justice system promotes 
such a result by way of incentives. The bargain reached may not reflect 
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the defendant’s actual culpability, if any, but it does reflect a mutually 
agreed resolution to cases that pose risks for both sides: a prosecutor acts 
based on the risk of an acquittal at trial while the defendant acts based on 
the risk of increased punishment. Under the crime control model of crim-
inal process, once a plea bargain is reached and accepted by the court, an 
optimal result has been achieved. 
B. Defending the Traditional Rule: Jeopardy Attaches upon a Court’s 
Acceptance of a Guilty Plea 
After the negotiation of a plea bargain that is acceptable to both the 
prosecution and the defendant, the court must still accept the guilty plea 
and the plea agreement. The question of whether a court should accept a 
bargain is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
148
 As discussed supra 
in Part II, under the traditional rule, jeopardy attaches when the plea is 
accepted.
149
 This rule is appropriate for two reasons: first, the court has 
considerable discretion in accepting the terms of plea agreements; sec-
ond, vacating an already-accepted plea deprives both the defendants and 
prosecution of the benefits of their bargain, and it makes the plea bar-
gaining process less efficient and less reliable. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide trial judges with 
the discretion to accept or reject the terms of plea bargains.
150
 Only one 
type of plea agreement contemplated within the rules is binding on the 
court once the agreement is accepted: an agreement in which the prose-
cution and defendant agree on “a specific sentence or sentencing 
range . . . or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or 
policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply.”
151
 Two 
other types of plea agreements specified do not further constrain the 
court’s discretion in sentencing: agreements to move for dismissal or not 
to bring other charges,
152
 and agreements to “recommend, or agree not to 
oppose the defendant’s request, that a particular sentence or sentencing 
range is appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not 
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apply.”
153
 The court may defer its decision on accepting or rejecting a 
plea agreement—involving either moving to dismiss or not bringing ad-
ditional charges, or agreeing on an appropriate sentence—pending its 
review of a pre-sentencing report.
154
 With this range of options, there is 
no need to reject the traditional rule that jeopardy attaches upon uncondi-
tional acceptance of a guilty plea. A plea agreement that only provides 
for a recommended sentence is not binding on the court to begin with, 
and the court can defer its acceptance or rejection of the other types of 
plea agreements if it has concerns. 
Further, allowing a court to sua sponte vacate an already-accepted 
guilty plea needlessly deprives both the prosecution and the defendant of 
the benefit of their bargain. In turn, the sua sponte decision decreases the 
efficiency and reliability of the plea bargaining process. The courts have 
noted that “[p]lea bargains rest on contractual principles, and each party 
should receive the benefits of its bargain.”
155
 Beyond the normative value 
of honoring accepted plea agreements as contracts, the traditional rule 
promotes efficiency and reliability in the plea bargaining process. When 
a court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, this gives the defendant a sense 
of finality—the guilty plea itself is an expression of the defendant’s de-
sire to admit guilt and move forward. Finality interests are heightened in 
the context of a plea bargain because the existence of the plea bargain 
itself shows a desire for finality on the part of the prosecution as well as 
the defendant. Specifically, a plea bargain signals a prosecutor’s deter-
mination of what resources should be expended in the prosecution, as 
well as an acceptable outcome based on the facts and circumstances of 
the case. Vacating an accepted plea bargain thus imposes costs beyond 
what the prosecution believes appropriate for the case and upsets the 
heightened finality interests of the defendant. Such a result is undesirable 
under the crime control model, which places “a premium on speed and 
finality” in order to maximize the rate of conviction in light of limited 
resources.
156
 
The traditional rule that jeopardy attaches upon acceptance of a 
guilty plea is appropriate in a system where the court retains discretion to 
accept, reject, or defer a decision on a plea bargain and, in some cases, 
retains sentencing discretion even upon acceptance of a plea bargain. 
Further, a rule preventing a court from sua sponte vacating an accepted 
guilty plea over the objection of the defendant ensures that the bargain 
reached is honored, with the accompanying finality interests. This pre-
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vents additional resources from being expended against the wishes of the 
prosecution and thus increases the efficiency of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 
C. Offensive Guilty Pleas and the Problems of a Broad Reading of    
Ohio v. Johnson 
Aside from negating the benefits of the traditional rule discussed 
above, the new rule relies on a broad reading of Johnson v. Ohio that 
does not give proper weight to the somewhat unusual factual scenario 
present in that case. Specifically, Johnson involved the “offensive” use
157
 
of a guilty plea to lesser-included offenses in an attempt to escape prose-
cution on the greater charges.
158
 The Court’s analysis in Johnson gave 
great weight to the fact that the guilty plea was accepted over the objec-
tion of the prosecutor
159
 and to the lack of an implicit acquittal that oc-
curs when a defendant is convicted of the lesser of two possible charg-
es.
160
 These facts led to the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Johnson’s inter-
ests in “the principles of finality and prevention of prosecutorial over-
reaching” were not implicated by further prosecution on the greater of-
fenses.
161
 
The unique facts that led to the Court’s conclusion in Johnson were 
overlooked in the development of the new rule in subsequent decisions. 
Specifically, in Gilmore v. Zimmerman,
162
 the Third Circuit downplayed 
the significance of prosecutorial objection in concluding that jeopardy 
does not necessarily attach upon a court’s acceptance of a defendant’s 
plea of guilty. The Gilmore court acknowledged that the prosecutor had 
not objected to Dr. Gilmore’s guilty plea but concluded that “[f]rom the 
standpoint of the defendant and those interests of his protected by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, however, this seems to us a factual difference 
which should have no legal significance.”
163
 While the Third Circuit did 
not explain its reasoning in concluding that Dr. Gilmore’s finality inter-
est was not implicated, its remark was situated within a discussion of 
cases that involved the offensive use of guilty pleas.
164
 Based on that 
context, a possible basis for the Third Circuit’s conclusion is that when a 
defendant pleads guilty to lesser charges in order to escape prosecution 
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on a greater charge, it is the defendant’s own “action that caused the as-
serted ‘successive’ proceeding” that forms the basis of a double jeopardy 
claim.
165
 
However, the lack of prosecutorial objection clearly distinguishes 
Gilmore from Johnson in terms of the implicated finality interests. In the 
context of a bargained-for plea deal, as was present in Gilmore,
166
 a de-
fendant has a finality interest that is not present when there is no plea 
deal. In the case of an offensive guilty plea, a defendant does not have a 
finality interest due to the ongoing prosecution. By contrast, a plea deal 
indicates that the government and the defendant have agreed upon a mu-
tually acceptable resolution to the case. Even if the sentence recommen-
dation or the plea agreement is not binding on the judge, as was the case 
in Gilmore,
167
 the defendant still has a finality interest in the resolution of 
the charge or charges, as any sentencing discretion that the judge retains 
is constrained by the statutory sentencing range for the offense that the 
defendant pleaded guilty.
168
 Thus, even in the absence of a guaranteed 
sentence, the resolution of the charges itself establishes a finality interest 
that is implicated when a court sua sponte vacates an already-accepted 
guilty plea. 
While the First Circuit stated that “[t]he mere acceptance of a guilty 
plea does not carry the same expectation of finality and tranquility that 
comes with a jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sentence” 
in concluding that jeopardy does not necessarily attach upon the uncondi-
tional acceptance of a guilty plea,
169
 the court arrived at this conclusion 
due to its reading of Johnson. And similar to the Third Circuit in Gil-
more, the First Circuit failed to note the distinction between the offensive 
use of the guilty plea and plea bargains. While the facts of Soto—where 
the court vacated Mr. Soto’s guilty plea over the government’s objection 
on the basis of his mere assertion of innocence
170
—are different from 
those in Gilmore, neither case involved the offensive use of a guilty plea. 
Even if a defendant has a diminished finality interest in a guilty plea over 
the prosecutor’s objection, this principle is inapplicable to those cases 
where the guilty plea is entered pursuant to a plea bargain. Indeed, the 
Court in Johnson emphasized that “ending prosecution now would deny 
the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who 
have violated its laws.”
171
 This concern is simply not present in cases 
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where plea bargains are reached because the bargain represents the pros-
ecution’s decision on the means by which it exercises its right to attempt 
to obtain a conviction. 
The Court in Johnson also emphasized the lack of an implied ac-
quittal
172
 where there is an “acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included 
offenses while charges on the greater offenses remain pending.”
173
 The 
Third Circuit drew a parallel between the situation in Johnson and the 
situation in Gilmore, concluding that further prosecution of Dr. Gilmore 
did not violate “the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against suc-
cessive prosecutions for the same offense.”
174
 However, the doctrine of 
implied acquittal is less relevant when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant 
to a plea bargain. When a defendant is convicted at trial of a lesser in-
cluded offense, the prosecution has been given its chance to secure a 
conviction on the greater charge. However, in the case of a plea bargain, 
the prosecution waives its chance; the prosecution is not denied a chance 
at securing a conviction on the greater charge. Even if the greater charge 
is still technically “pending” at the point when a guilty plea pursuant to a 
plea bargain is accepted, it is a drastically different situation than that in 
Johnson, where the guilty plea occurred during the arraignment on the 
greater and lesser included offenses.
175
 Specifically, the plea bargain sig-
nals an intent not to pursue the more serious charges, which suggests that 
those charges should no longer be viewed as pending once the guilty plea 
is accepted. 
This is not to say that Johnson was incorrectly decided. Defendants 
should not be allowed “to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to 
prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining 
charges.”
176
 However, the decision in Johnson does not require that the 
courts discard the traditional rule. A narrow reading of Johnson, permit-
ting continued prosecution “only when the charges of greater and lesser 
included offenses are brought in a multi–count indictment in a single 
prosecution and the prosecutor objects to acceptance of the guilty plea,” 
is more appropriate.
177
 In other words, Johnson should be used to create 
an exception to the general rule that jeopardy attaches when a guilty plea 
is accepted, rather than being read as a fundamental shift in Double 
Jeopardy Clause analysis. The concern of depriving the prosecution of its 
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chance to convict the defendant is not present in cases where conviction 
is obtained via plea bargain. 
Furthermore, the reading of Johnson that the courts in Gilmore and 
Soto rely on fails to sufficiently protect a defendant’s finality interest in 
plea bargains. An early commentator on Johnson and its ramifications 
warned of “a danger that lower courts will misconstrue the decision and 
extend it to deny an accused certain constitutionally protected rights.”
178
 
This concern has seemingly been validated as the development of the 
new rule essentially strips the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
from defendants who plead guilty but have their guilty pleas vacated by 
the court on its own motion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Pedro Cabrera’s plight, discussed above in Part I, shows the effect 
of the shift from the traditional rule to the new rule in a drastic way. Be-
fore Gilmore v. Zimmerman and United States v. Soto, Mr. Cabrera prob-
ably would have been entitled to sentencing on his original plea. Howev-
er, in the wake of the post-Johnson split, Mr. Cabrera and similarly situ-
ated defendants face uncertainty even after their plea bargains are initial-
ly accepted; whether the judge can vacate those pleas depends on where 
the defendants are charged. 
The traditional rule, that jeopardy attaches at the point a guilty plea 
is accepted, provides clarity and allows for efficient plea bargaining. 
Prosecutors and defendants both benefit from the certainty that comes 
with the acceptance of a guilty plea under the traditional rule, especially 
in light of a judge’s discretion to initially accept the plea. Further, the 
traditional rule is more compatible with the central role of plea bargain-
ing in the criminal justice system. 
On the other hand, the new rule, requiring a case-specific inquiry 
into the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is based on an over-
broad reading of Johnson which dealt with the offensive use of plea bar-
gains. The concerns that led to the holding in Johnson are not relevant in 
cases of plea bargains, and applying Johnson to those cases is inappro-
priate. Moreover, the cases developing and applying the new rule under-
estimate the defendant’s finality interest in plea bargains, even if the sen-
tence is uncertain. 
The existing circuit split over whether jeopardy generally attaches 
upon acceptance of a guilty plea or not is ripe for resolution. The finality 
of an accepted guilty plea should not vary across the circuits, especially 
considering that a constitutional protection is implicated. The Supreme 
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Court should clarify the applicability of Johnson to cases not involving 
offensive guilty pleas by preserving the traditional rule, with an excep-
tion for cases where the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included of-
fense over the prosecutor’s objection. Such a decision would promote 
efficiency and protect finality interests while also preserving the gov-
ernment’s right to a fair shot at convicting those accused of criminal 
conduct. 
 
